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As one might expect, there is a strong correlation between inflation and 
inflation expectations. It has been empirically verified by a number of authors and can 
be seen in chart 1, below, which plots inflation expectations of the general public and 
professionals against RPI inflation
1. 


























































Source: Barclays BASIX, Bank of England 
 
However, the direction of causality – in other words the lead-lag relationship 
between inflation and inflation expectations - has remained a contentious issue. This 
warrants some investigation, as inflation expectations are deemed to play an important 
part in an inflation targeting regime. In the neo-Keynesian model (see, for example, 
Clarida et al. 2000), sticky prices result in forward looking behaviour; inflation today 
is a function of expected future inflation as well as the pressure of demand, captured 
in an output gap term. Thus expectations are deemed to be an important link in the 
monetary transmission mechanism, and monetary policy can be more successful when 
inflation expectations are well anchored (which is taken to mean insensitive to 
incoming data (Bernanke 2007)).   
                                                 
1 Although, as noted by Driver and Windram (2007), the strength of the correlation depends on the 
period under consideration. 
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Granger sense) between inflation and inflation expectations. Clearly, the mechanism 
assumed above is that if inflation expectations were to become de-anchored, they may 
cause inflation to move away from target. But at the same time, if inflation were 
persistently away from the target, this in turn could cause expectations to become 
deanchored. One could speculate that the introduction of inflation targeting in 1992, 
and/or the change in the monetary arrangements that gave the Bank of England 
independence in 1997 might have had an impact on the relationship – notably making 
expectations less sensitive to changes in the inflation rate
2. This will be investigated 
in what follows.  
If the causal relationship between inflation and inflation expectations has 
changed, this suggests that either the mechanism by which inflation expectations 
influence inflation has changed, or else the manner in which agents form their 
expectations has changed. Most models assume that expectations are formed 
rationally. In practice this is unlikely to be the case; it is more likely that agents form 
their expectations heterogeneously, relying on different models and datasets, and 
having different capabilities for processing information (see Branch, 2004; Carroll, 
2003, Brock and Hommes, 1997). Furthermore there may be a degree of learning 
taking place over time (see Pfajfar and Santoro, 2006, Orphanides and Williams, 
2003). More generally, Driver and Windram (2007) note that some agents may form 
                                                 
2 There has been some work done in this area, most obviously a submission by the Bank of England to 
the Treasury Select Committee entitled ‘The MPC Ten Years On’. Further papers address the issue of 
whether inflation targeting has changed the time series properties of the economic system (see Benati, 
2007,  2005), and documents the fall in the persistence and predictability of inflation. Benati also 
shows how inflation targeting has affected inflation in several countries, and relates the results to 
theoretical New Keynesian models (Benati 2008). 
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inflation and unemployment or demand; others may use an empirical approach, e.g. 
their recent memories of inflation data. Furthermore, people may be entirely forward 
looking or entirely backward looking. More simplistically, in inflation targeting 
countries, people may simply assume inflation will equal the target. The issue of how 
agents form their expectations has attracted an extensive literature (see Bakhshi and 
Yates 1998), and investigation of this aspect is beyond the scope of this paper; rather 
this paper will simply seek to assess whether a change may have occurred.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA ISSUES 
The methodology followed in the paper seeks to improve on earlier methodologies by 
avoiding the use of standard Granger causality tests, instead using a more appropriate 
methodology for time series data. As noted by Mavrotas and Kelly (2001) testing the 
direction of causality (in the Granger sense of lead-lag relations) has generally been 
performed using either the Granger or Sims tests (see Granger, 1969, Sims, 1972). 
These tests are based on null hypotheses formulated as zero restrictions on the 
coefficients of the lags of a subset of the variables. However, such tests are grounded 
in asymptotic theory, which is only valid for stationary variables. Many 
macroeconomic variables are known to be non-stationary, meaning inferences based 
on asymptotic theory can only be made if a vector autoregression is estimated in 
differences, and therefore stationary. However, unit root tests to establish stationarity 
have low power against the alternative hypothesis of trend stationarity; and similarly, 
the tests for cointegrating rank in Johansen’s tests are sensitive to the values of trend 
and constant terms in finite samples and so are not very reliable for typical time-series 
sample sizes. Since implementation of both the Sims and Granger tests for Granger 
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inferences could be made about the issue of Granger causality simply because of the 
sensitivity of stationarity or cointegration tests.  
While problems in testing for integration and cointegration have to be suffered 
if one’s interests are in the cointegrating relations themselves, Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995) noted that in many applications of VAR models, for example Granger 
causality testing, the researcher has scant interest in the existence of unit roots or 
cointegration relations themselves, instead being interested in testing economic 
hypotheses expressed as restrictions on coefficients of the model.  Thus they propose 
a causality test that fits a standard vector autoregression in the levels of the variables. 
This minimises the risks associated with wrongly identifying the orders of intergration 
of the series, or the presence of cointegration, and minimises the distortion of the 
tests’ sizes as a result of pre-testing (Giles, 1997, Mavrotas and Kelly, 2001).  
Toda and Yamamoto’s methodology proceeds as follows. First the model must 
be specified, which involves determining the optimal lag lengths of the levels of own 
and other variables in the model. This is done by minimising the Akaike’s 
Information Criterion – this assesses the goodness of fit of the model, but improves on 
standard methods such as RSS or R
2 as it takes into account improvements in 
goodness of fit that arise simply due to increasing the number of explanatory variables 
in the model. Having specified the VAR, its robustness is tested using 
misspecification tests. Having determined a lag length k, we then estimate a (k+d)th 
order VAR where d is the maximal order of integration that we suspect might occur in 
the process (The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) is 
used to test for unit roots). The coefficient matrices of the last d lagged vectors in the 
model are ignored (since these are regarded as zeros) and we can test linear or 
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theory. 
The question of data is an important one. There are two considerations – first, 
what measure of inflation expectations to use, and second, what measure of inflation? 
Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) undertake a comprehensive study in the area of 
measuring inflation expectations. There are a number of possible ways to measure 
expectations, which fall into two main groups. First, expectations can be measured 
through surveys, including surveys of consumer attitudes and behaviour, surveys of 
economists working in industry and surveys of professional forecasters. Second, 
expectations can be measured by the difference in yields between nominal and 
indexed bonds. For the purpose of this exercise, we use survey-based data
3, more 
specifically data from the Barclays BASIX survey, due to the availability of a long 
time series (from 1986) and due to the large number of individuals surveyed from a 
wide variety of backgrounds. This is a quarterly survey that asks business economists, 
finance directors, academic economists and trade unions for their expectations of RPI 
inflation over the next 12 months. It also surveys members of the public, who are 
asked ‘from this list, can you tell me what you would expect the rate of inflation to be 
over the next 12 months?’ ‘below zero’, ‘about 1%’, ‘about 2%’,…, ‘about 10%’, 
‘above 10%’, ‘don’t know’. Mean forecasts for each of the sectors are published, but 
individual forecasts are not so the sample size for each of the sectors is unknown in 
each survey. 
                                                 
3 From the point of view of causality, the interest of financial market information is likely to be its 
influence on those surveyed, so looking at survey data is more instructive here. However, the 
relationship between expectations extracted from financial market information and inflation, and 
expectations extracted from financial market information and survey data is an interesting future area 
for research.  
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public may form their expectations differently
4, and thus the causal relationship 
between inflation and expectations may differ for the two groups. Consequently, the 
causal relationship between RPI and the expectations of the two groups are tested 
separately.  
Given the current target for the Bank of England is to maintain consumer price 
inflation at 2%, it may seem obvious to use CPI as the measure of inflation. However, 
this has only been the target since December 2003, prior to which the target (from 
1992) was retail price inflation excluding mortgage costs (RPIX) at 2.5%. To 
complicate matters, the wording of the question to the general public in the BASIX 
survey is not explicit about whether the expectations relate to CPI or RPI. Given that 
the professionals are explicitly asked about RPI, and that studies (Bank of England 
2008) suggest that the general public are more likely to refer to RPI than CPI when 
asked about inflation, the decision was taken to focus on RPI
5. The fact that the 
Bank’s inflation target is currently based on CPI is not considered to be an issue: from 
the point of view of this study what is of concern is the existence of a fixed target.  
The data are split into three periods, representing three monetary regimes. The first 
covers 1986 to the time when inflation targeting was introduced, following Sterling’s 
exit from the ERM. The second covers 1992 Q4 to 1997 Q3, in other words the 
inflation targeting regime prior to Bank of England independence. The third covers 
the period to date in which the Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England 
has had operational responsibility for meeting the inflation target.  
                                                 
4 Not least on account of the use of different datasets. 
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The first stage involves specifying the VAR by using Akaike’s Information 
Criterion (AIC) to determine the lag structure. The results are given in table 1, with 
the optimal lag length indicated in italic type. GP indicates the expectations of the 
general public, and XGP representing a weighted mean of the expectations of business 
economists, finance directors, academic economists and trade unions. 
 
Table 1: Lag structure: Akaike Information Criterion 
1997Q3-2007Q4 0 1 2 3 4
Dependent variable
RPI  2.682 1.327 1.083 1.086 1.002
GP 0.279 -0.269 -0.249 -0.242 -0.245
XGP 0.492 -0.433 -0.447 -0.37 -0.68
Other variable
RPI (GP) 1.002 1.042 1.043 1.046 1.087
GP (RPI) -0.242 -0.233 -0.23 -0.199 -0.258
RPI (XGP) 0.636 0.696 0.736 0.801 0.813
XGP (RPI) -0.37 -0.381 -0.364 -0.303 -0.737
1993Q1-1997Q2
Dependent variable
RPI  1.471 1.033 0.997 1.132 1.271
GP -0.646 -0.516 -0.396 -0.281 -0.179
XGP -0.485 -0.522 -0.404 -0.323 -0.289
Other variable
RPI (GP) 0.997 1.098 1.059 1.201 1.33
GP (RPI) -0.179 -0.185 -1.053 -0.94 -1.069
RPI (XGP) 0.997 0.975 1.019 1.124 1.267
XGP (RPI) -0.289 -0.187 -0.125 -0.141 -0.006
1986Q4-1992Q4
Dependent variable
RPI  4.593 3.013 2.442 2.488 2.576
GP 3.213 2.184 2.279 2.374 2.379
XGP 3.266 1.823 1.856 1.893 1.97
Other variable
RPI (GP) 2.442 2.351 2.298 2.39 2.482
GP (RPI) 2.184 2.203 2.038 1.944 1.967
RPI (XGP) 2.442 1.961 1.951 2.029 1.755
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length of GP in the RPI equation, and XGP in the RPI equation in the most recent 
period is zero, there is no Granger causality running from expectations of the general 
public or professionals to RPI. Following a similar rationale, there is no Granger 
causality between expectations of the general public and RPI in the second period. For 
the remaining relationships, the results indicate that there may be Granger causality, 
and further testing is required.  
Before Granger causality testing can be undertaken, the econometric and 
statistical adequacy of the models must be examined. System linearity is tested using 
the Ramsey RESET test. Tests for departures from the independence assumption of 
the error term are performed using Lagrange Multiplier (LM1-LM3) tests, and system 
normality is tested using Jarque-Bera tests. The results are shown in table 2: 
 
Table 2: Misspecification diagnostics 
 
Equation JB LM1 LM2 LM3 RESET
1997Q3-2007Q4
GP (RPI) 0.566 0.101 1.347 1.421 1.721
(0.754) (0.753) (0.275) (0.257) (0.199)
XGP (RPI) 4.303 4.725 6.211 3.979 1.102
(0.116) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.304)
1993Q1-1997Q2
RPI (XGP) 5.027 0.216 0.153 0.297 0.063
(0.081) (0.653) (0.861) (0.827) (0.808)
XGP (RPI) 0.675 2.217 0.96 0.651 0.927
(0.714) (0.211) (0.476) (0.653) (0.390)
1986Q4-1992Q4
RPI (GP) 2.755 0.139 0.278 0.173 0.025
(0.252) (0.715) (0.761) (0.913) (0.877)
GP (RPI) 1.413 0.613 1.193 0.759 1.247
(0.493) (0.446) (0.332) (0.537) (0.282)
RPI (XGP) 0.653 2.599 1.562 1.274 2.104
(0.722) (0.128) (0.244) (0.324) (0.168)
XGP (RPI) 0.169 5.099 4.387 2.792 4.206
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values. Overall the models appear to be robust. The next stage of the Toda-Yamamoto 
procedure involves adding an extra lag of each of the variables to each equation, 
according to the maximal order of integration we suspect might occur in the process, 
and using a standard Wald test to see if the coefficients of the lagged ‘other’ variables 
(except the additional one) are jointly zero. Thus as a first stage we must establish the 
suspected maximal order of integration, which is done using Augmented Dickey 
Fuller tests. The results are reported in table 3; an asterisk indicates that the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level.  
 















The 5% critical value is 1.95  
 
 
From these results, we conclude that for all periods the maximum suspected 
order of integration of each of the variables is one, so we add one extra lag. The 































These results give the Wald statistic, with p-values in parentheses. These 
results indicate that for the period before inflation targeting was introduced, we find 
no Granger causality from expectations of the general public to RPI, but we find 
Granger causality running from RPI to expectations. Bidirectional Granger causality 
is found between XGP and RPI. However, for both subsequent periods, when inflation 
targeting was in use, there was no Granger causality from RPI to expectations of the 
general public, so overall we can conclude that there is no Granger causality running 




                                                 
6 This result could also be explained by findings that inflation becomes unpredictable in a credible 
inflation targeting regime. Benati and Surico (2007) use a standard sticky-price model to show that a 
more aggressive policy stance towards inflation in the US caused a decline in inflation predictability.  
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In this paper a robust methodology has been used to examine the direction of 
Granger causality between inflation and inflation expectations of the general public 
and of professionals over three periods, corresponding to developments in the UK 
monetary regime. The findings have two possible interpretations: that a change in the 
Granger causality reflects a change in the mechanism by which inflation expectations 
influence inflation, or that the manner in which agents form their expectations has 
changed. The distinction between these two possibilities is quite subtle. We consider 
these in turn.  
Prior to the introduction of inflation targeting, the expectations of both the 
general public and professionals were driven by the rate of RPI inflation. That 
inflation expectations might be caused by current inflation, or at least perceptions of 
current inflation, is consistent with findings by Driver and Windram (2007), who find 
a correlation coefficient of 0.92 between NOP/Bank of England survey data of public 
expectations and perceptions of current inflation. The fact that the expectations of 
professionals ‘cause’ inflation while those of the general public do not is entirely 
plausible if one considers that the class of professionals includes those that are 
involved in setting prices and wages. What is of interest is the fact that neither group 
exhibits any sort of Granger causality after inflation targeting is introduced. The most 
obvious interpretation of expectations becoming less sensitive to current inflation, is 
that they became anchored to the target (which also suggests that the target was 
credible), rather than being based on the current rate of RPI inflation itself
7. This is in 
                                                 
7 Of course, we cannot discount the possibility that the general public have moved away from basing 
their inflation expectations on RPI and started basing them on CPI during the second period, and this 
has caused the result. 
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predictable inflation it is optimal to use less resources in fourecasting inflation. In 
particular agents tend to use simple heuristics (see Diron and Mojon, 2005). The fact 
that the Granger causality from professionals’ expectations to inflation broke down 
after targeting had been introduced could be put down to faith in the target meaning 
that this group interpreted deviations of inflation from target as temporary.  
What does this mean for expectation formation? Do these results suggest that 
the manner in which expectations are formed has changed? This is a plausible 
interpretation when one considers the results to refer to Granger causality, i.e. lead-lag 
relationships rather than causality per se. If expectations are ‘caused’ by past values 
of RPI, this suggests that they are backward looking. If, by contrast, RPI is ‘caused’ 
by expectations, rather than interpreting this as expectations driving RPI, we could 
interpret it as agents being forward-looking in forming their expectations. This 
explanation would sit well with the findings: the bidirectional Granger causality found 
among expectations of professionals might indicate that prior to independence they 
were both forward and backward looking in their formation of expectations – in other 
words adopted something proximate to rational expectations
8. But does the 
breakdown of the causal relationship mean that agents have become ‘less rational’? It 
is perhaps more useful here to consider the concept of ‘economically rational’ 
expectations (Feige and Pearce, 1976). This concept suggests that people should 
collect and process information until the cost of an additional piece of information 
outweighs the benefits of an improved forecast. In this case, provided the target is 
seen as credible, it is clear that anchoring expectations to the target is more 
                                                 
8 The question of whether expectations are rational or not is the subject of a vast literature and beyond 
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